WEBVTT 00:00:00.140 --> 00:00:03.020 Two men knew that the space shuttle challenger was going to explode 00:00:03.021 --> 00:00:06.801 on January 28th, 1986. And they did everything they could to stop it, 00:00:06.900 --> 00:00:09.160 but they couldn't. Here's what happened. 00:00:09.220 --> 00:00:10.020 On the morning launch, 00:00:10.021 --> 00:00:14.021 Bob Evling and Roger Boyce Jolie called their boss at Morton Thiault 00:00:14.022 --> 00:00:16.501 and told him they need to get NASA on the phone. 00:00:16.502 --> 00:00:18.301 The space shuttle was gonna blow up, 00:00:18.302 --> 00:00:20.821 and they should know. They designed the rocket. 00:00:20.822 --> 00:00:22.981 The space shuttle used two different types of rockets 00:00:22.982 --> 00:00:24.401 to get it to outer space. 00:00:24.700 --> 00:00:28.240 Inside of this large tank was liquid rocket fuel 00:00:28.300 --> 00:00:30.380 that was fed through the space shuttle 00:00:30.381 --> 00:00:32.481 to the space shuttle's own engines 00:00:32.540 --> 00:00:34.520 and then expelled out the back. 00:00:34.660 --> 00:00:37.660 But there were additionally two rocket boosters 00:00:37.661 --> 00:00:40.721 that were solid fuel rocket boosters. 00:00:40.740 --> 00:00:43.920 And these were designed and built by Morton Thiokol 00:00:44.060 --> 00:00:46.380 and by Roger and Bob. Now, 00:00:46.381 --> 00:00:49.821 these things were so big, they couldn't be manufactured in one piece. 00:00:49.822 --> 00:00:53.741 And so what they did was they made a series of small little pieces. 00:00:53.742 --> 00:00:56.401 And then stack them together like a pancake. 00:00:56.680 --> 00:00:58.260 To make a completely sealed connection 00:00:58.261 --> 00:01:00.441 between each component of the rocket. 00:01:00.500 --> 00:01:01.880 They used an O ring. 00:01:02.060 --> 00:01:04.620 How an O ring works is you put it into a little groove, 00:01:04.621 --> 00:01:06.401 and it's bigger than the groove. 00:01:06.580 --> 00:01:09.380 Then when you apply pressure from another piece of metal, 00:01:09.381 --> 00:01:13.161 it expands out and completely seals the area. 00:01:13.380 --> 00:01:15.100 Now, we use the exact same setup. 00:01:15.101 --> 00:01:16.821 Scuba diving inside of there. 00:01:16.822 --> 00:01:21.281 That black ring, it's an O ring onto This huge tank of compressed air. 00:01:21.300 --> 00:01:24.380 Think of it as a rocket. I can take another piece of metal, 00:01:24.381 --> 00:01:25.741 attach it, apply pressure. 00:01:25.742 --> 00:01:28.981 The O ring will expand and create an airtight connection. 00:01:28.982 --> 00:01:32.161 But watch what happens if I cut a small nick in that O ring. 00:01:33.980 --> 00:01:38.400 Now Alternate Air is able to get out through that connection. 00:01:38.580 --> 00:01:41.020 That's bad. Bob and Roger knew that 00:01:41.021 --> 00:01:43.681 the exact same thing was going to happen to the challenger. 00:01:43.740 --> 00:01:45.700 You see, in order for an O ring to work, 00:01:45.701 --> 00:01:48.401 it has to be pliable when you push on it. 00:01:48.420 --> 00:01:50.060 Overnight at Cape Canaveral, 00:01:50.061 --> 00:01:52.561 the temperature had dropped to freezing. 00:01:52.620 --> 00:01:53.860 And when that happens, 00:01:53.861 --> 00:01:57.441 the rubber becomes brittle and could no longer bend, 00:01:57.540 --> 00:02:00.400 meaning that it could no longer fill that gap. 00:02:00.580 --> 00:02:02.740 When Bob and Roger explained what was going to happen 00:02:02.741 --> 00:02:04.441 to their bosses at Martin Marietta, 00:02:04.500 --> 00:02:05.180 they agreed 00:02:05.181 --> 00:02:08.761 and immediately called NASA and told them to halt the launch. 00:02:08.900 --> 00:02:11.220 But three things went wrong during that phone call. 00:02:11.221 --> 00:02:14.341 The first thing was that NASA let outside pressures 00:02:14.342 --> 00:02:15.981 other than engineering and safety 00:02:15.982 --> 00:02:17.701 affect their decision. You see, 00:02:17.702 --> 00:02:21.161 there was a lot of pressure on NASA to get that space shuttle up. 00:02:21.260 --> 00:02:23.100 Krista Mcauliffe was also on board, 00:02:23.101 --> 00:02:25.321 the first school teacher to go into space. 00:02:25.340 --> 00:02:27.300 And it was scheduled to be broadcast 00:02:27.301 --> 00:02:29.601 to classrooms all over the country. 00:02:30.180 --> 00:02:32.780 And Ronald Reagan had a state of the union address coming up 00:02:32.781 --> 00:02:36.081 where he wanted to talk about the space shuttle being in the sky. 00:02:36.300 --> 00:02:38.160 They needed to get it up there. 00:02:38.700 --> 00:02:42.180 when Martin Thigpen explained the problem to Lawrence Malloy at NASA, 00:02:42.181 --> 00:02:43.261 he lashed out. And he says, 00:02:43.262 --> 00:02:44.541 well, when do you want me to launch this? 00:02:44.542 --> 00:02:49.121 Next April. And that's when price became a factor. 00:02:49.340 --> 00:02:52.020 NASA was Martin Thigpen's largest client, 00:02:52.021 --> 00:02:53.481 and they were mad. 00:02:54.100 --> 00:02:56.160 Which leads us to the second problem. 00:02:56.220 --> 00:02:58.980 The people who made the decision to go 00:02:58.981 --> 00:03:01.961 were not the people who knew the most about the issue. 00:03:02.100 --> 00:03:05.740 They were higher UPS who knew a lot about the program as a whole. 00:03:05.741 --> 00:03:08.201 But didn't understand this issue. 00:03:08.580 --> 00:03:11.380 And that lack of expertise would make them grab this, 00:03:11.381 --> 00:03:13.421 the wrong chart. You see, 00:03:13.422 --> 00:03:15.501 NASA knew that a failure of the O rings 00:03:15.502 --> 00:03:17.901 could result in an explosion of the space shuttle. 00:03:17.902 --> 00:03:19.621 They had done their own internal analysis 00:03:19.622 --> 00:03:22.061 and concluded that the chance of that happening 00:03:22.062 --> 00:03:28.481 was only one out of every 100,000 launches. Point zero zero one %. 00:03:28.940 --> 00:03:31.840 But there was a flaw in that analysis. 00:03:32.060 --> 00:03:32.900 See, what they had done is 00:03:32.901 --> 00:03:35.261 they'd look at the O rings after every single launch. 00:03:35.262 --> 00:03:37.181 And they could tell that every once in a while 00:03:37.182 --> 00:03:41.201 there was some defect that manifested in the O rings. 00:03:41.400 --> 00:03:44.820 This is the number of defects they found on any given launch. 00:03:44.821 --> 00:03:48.161 And this is the temperature of the launch. 00:03:48.180 --> 00:03:50.500 They looked at this data and said, look, 00:03:50.501 --> 00:03:52.221 we have problems with the O rings when it's cold. 00:03:52.222 --> 00:03:54.421 But we also have problems with the O rings when it's warm. 00:03:54.422 --> 00:03:57.661 Therefore, Temperature must not be what's causing the issue, 00:03:57.662 --> 00:04:01.541 so we can rule that out. But what they didn't look at 00:04:01.542 --> 00:04:06.281 is the number of times there were no issues with the O rings. 00:04:06.540 --> 00:04:09.980 So there had been nine different times 00:04:09.981 --> 00:04:13.421 that the space shuttle flew with no problems, 00:04:13.422 --> 00:04:16.401 and all of them was when it was warm. 00:04:16.800 --> 00:04:19.560 What that means is that above 65 degrees, 00:04:19.620 --> 00:04:24.160 there was only a 15% chance there would be some issue with the O ring. 00:04:24.380 --> 00:04:29.120 Below 65 degrees, that rose to 100%. 00:04:29.500 --> 00:04:32.100 If this graph had been properly prepared, 00:04:32.101 --> 00:04:36.641 it would have shown this drastic increase as things cooled off 00:04:36.700 --> 00:04:38.360 and the challenger launch. 00:04:38.500 --> 00:04:40.240 It wasn't even on the chart. 00:04:40.300 --> 00:04:41.960 It was clear over here. 00:04:42.220 --> 00:04:45.140 So NASA pushed back on the Martin Thoracol executives, 00:04:45.141 --> 00:04:46.621 who went back to Bob and Roger 00:04:46.622 --> 00:04:49.521 and tried to get them to change their opinions. 00:04:49.580 --> 00:04:51.500 But Bob and Roger refused. 00:04:51.501 --> 00:04:53.201 They knew what would happen. 00:04:53.420 --> 00:04:55.320 And Morton Thiokol executives, 00:04:55.380 --> 00:04:57.800 knowing where their paycheck came from, 00:04:58.220 --> 00:05:01.760 decided to tell NASA that it was okay to go ahead anyway. 00:05:01.900 --> 00:05:04.200 And so the decision was made to launch. 00:05:04.300 --> 00:05:07.460 Hearing the news, Bob jumped into the car with his daughter Sophia 00:05:07.461 --> 00:05:10.581 and drove to Morton Thiokol to try and do something. 00:05:10.582 --> 00:05:11.661 On the way, he told her, 00:05:11.662 --> 00:05:13.521 the challenger is going to explode. 00:05:13.620 --> 00:05:15.240 Everybody's going to die. 00:05:15.940 --> 00:05:16.780 Point six, nine, 00:05:16.781 --> 00:05:18.021 eight seconds into the flight, 00:05:18.022 --> 00:05:21.961 right here can be seen on the cameras a little bit of smoke. 00:05:22.020 --> 00:05:23.680 That was the O ring failing. 00:05:23.840 --> 00:05:25.660 Fifty eight seconds into the flight, 00:05:25.661 --> 00:05:28.341 and the space shuttle begins to rotate. 00:05:28.342 --> 00:05:31.221 As it does, it puts stress on these joints, 00:05:31.222 --> 00:05:32.981 and at 58 seconds in, 00:05:32.982 --> 00:05:37.441 you can see flames start to come out of this joint right here. 00:05:37.720 --> 00:05:39.220 That was a critical location 00:05:39.221 --> 00:05:42.201 because there was a strut that was located nearby, 00:05:42.380 --> 00:05:46.920 attaching the booster rocket to the rest of the assembly. 00:05:47.180 --> 00:05:52.020 At 73 seconds in, that strut burns through, 00:05:52.021 --> 00:05:57.141 and as it does, the pressure of this rocket pushes out this way, 00:05:57.142 --> 00:06:03.761 which brings this end in, and it goes into and punctures the main tank, 00:06:03.980 --> 00:06:05.320 and it explodes. 00:06:06.260 --> 00:06:08.020 This is where the crew is. 00:06:08.021 --> 00:06:10.521 The crew assembly remained intact. 00:06:10.660 --> 00:06:15.600 It would fall until three minutes and 58 seconds into the flight, 00:06:15.660 --> 00:06:19.360 until it hit the ocean at 200 miles per hour. 00:06:19.860 --> 00:06:22.920 NASA has been unable to determine, 00:06:23.180 --> 00:06:26.000 or if they have, they have not shared, 00:06:26.180 --> 00:06:30.200 whether or not the crew was still alive when they hit the water. 00:06:30.700 --> 00:06:34.220 Following the explosion, two anonymous sources within Morton Thiokol 00:06:34.221 --> 00:06:37.161 contacted two journalists with MPR 00:06:37.180 --> 00:06:39.760 and explained to them exactly what had happened, 00:06:39.780 --> 00:06:42.480 how it had happened, and why it had happened. 00:06:43.100 --> 00:06:46.500 MPR would safeguard the identity of those two whistle blowers 00:06:46.501 --> 00:06:47.441 for decades, 00:06:48.060 --> 00:06:50.720 protecting them from retaliation from the government 00:06:50.740 --> 00:06:54.020 and from Morton's ire. Call in 2006, 00:06:54.021 --> 00:06:57.561 as the 30th anniversary of the challenger explosion approached, 00:06:57.620 --> 00:07:01.080 one of the journalists went to talk with one of his anonymous sources, 00:07:01.380 --> 00:07:03.980 and it was only then that permission was given. 00:07:03.981 --> 00:07:07.961 To reveal their identity. They were Bob and Roger. 00:07:08.540 --> 00:07:11.840 And it was only then that the reporter began to understand 00:07:11.980 --> 00:07:15.760 the incredible burden that these men had carried their whole life. 00:07:15.820 --> 00:07:17.580 Bob told him that in the whole thing, 00:07:17.581 --> 00:07:19.081 god made one mistake. 00:07:19.460 --> 00:07:23.360 He had selected Bob to be the man to raise the award. 00:07:23.700 --> 00:07:25.360 And he said, quote, 00:07:25.460 --> 00:07:27.840 god chose a loser. End quote. 00:07:28.140 --> 00:07:32.500 He had internalized the failure of stopping the launch. 00:07:32.501 --> 00:07:37.641 To him that it was his responsibility that those seven people had died. 00:07:37.980 --> 00:07:40.280 Following the 2,006 article, 00:07:40.340 --> 00:07:43.660 people from all over the world wrote to tell him 00:07:43.661 --> 00:07:47.061 that it wasn't his fault. Flight engineer Robert Lund 00:07:47.062 --> 00:07:50.501 and NASA's John Hardy were among those who reached out 00:07:50.502 --> 00:07:51.221 and told him 00:07:51.222 --> 00:07:54.681 that responsibility for that decision did not rest with him. 00:07:54.780 --> 00:07:58.720 It rested with them. It was not his burden to bear. 00:07:59.180 --> 00:08:01.860 Bob died at age 89, and his daughter, 00:08:01.861 --> 00:08:05.341 looking back at that outpouring of support that he received, 00:08:05.342 --> 00:08:08.841 said, it was as if he got permission from the world. 00:08:08.900 --> 00:08:11.840 He was able to let that part of his life go. 00:08:11.860 --> 00:08:13.560 He was able to die in peace, 00:08:13.780 --> 00:08:17.160 knowing that he had done all that he could have done.